

Art, Censorship and Socialism<sup>1</sup>  
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The inauguration of the socialist system opened a new epoch in the history of cultural liberty. Unfortunately, it has not yet turned out as well as anticipated. What was expected? The creative potential was to be realized as never before. The conditions for all varieties of artistic expression were to be secured, democratized and heightened.<sup>2</sup> In this perspective, the post-revolutionary developments in Russia have been perversely baffling. Or do we deceive ourselves? Was there never any substance in the promise? Were the assurances of a future cultural liberty a hoax? No, they weren't. The anticipations were grounded in theory, in the Marxist classics. The theory had substance.

Consider Marx's earliest political article, "Remarks on the New Instructions to the Prussian Censors," written in 1842. There he urged that the sole feasible way to "improve" the censorship, which was fallible, vile and malignant, was to abolish it. Marx buttressed this salvo with detailed analysis, which should be printed and reprinted, without cutting, every day in the press of every authoritarian government; alas, including the socialist nations. Marx argued that the supervision of a "moderate" attitude in one's writing was intolerable. The journalist and the artist inherently had the right to be truthful to themselves and the historical reality. To be creative at all in this framework meant possessing the license to be even bold and arrogant. Marx was incensed that the state should arrogate to itself and its functionaries the power to define what was reasonable. The government didn't have all the truths. The writer had the right to take up any topics that he wished, using the style of his choice. According to Marx, it was the censor's accomplishment to take custody of the writer's 'palette' of many hues and reduce it to gray-on-gray. Nor did the censor need more than a hunch, a suspicion that someone had pursued a non-official truth. He would proceed to grasp the diversity of mutually-qualifying truths, whether of thought or expression, and reduce them to the single acceptable Truth. The censor's work with legalisms covered up his gross cowardice. His claim to responsibility was a mocking parody of a genuinely responsible position. Another essay of 1842, "Debating the Freedom of the Press," also found Marx passing unequivocal judgment on the censor. His office enforced slavery and spurious truths in the face of the elemental tendencies of human existence. Marx introduced numerous powerful arguments against the captivity of the press. It was made to stand watch over the interests of the potentates but, like eunuchs ordered to guard a harem, it only gave the semblance of a virile function. In reality, Marx said, the

result of censorship was the opposite of the one intended. When freedom is set beyond the law, then its least manifestation becomes a prize to be chased.

Some scholars will say that these articles by Marx are mere juvenilia. They are the gushings of a revolutionary democrat, it's said, and are not the considered views of the future founder of the epoch-making socio-political doctrine. However, it can be shown that Marx's later writings simply produce a reinforcement and further development of these views. The immediate followers of Marx held similar ideas. They looked ahead to a happier tomorrow which promised no restrictions and the realm of art would be especially free. For example, Karl Kautsky in anticipating "the day after the revolution," spoke of regulation throughout the economic domain and the end of all regulation of spiritual production. A.V. Lunacharsky, Commissioner of Education and Culture in the Soviet Union in the hectic decade after the 1917 Revolution, never tired of saying that the artist must be as free as the birds and that an important aim of socialism was to secure this liberty for art. In Petrograd, one day, Lunacharsky addressed the youth of the First Free Artistic Laboratories. He had the task, anguishing and shaming for him, of justifying the introduction of the Bolshevik censor. And yet he used the occasion to again affirm the socialist goal of an end to all restrictions on art. The moment for that, however, had to be postponed, he said, to a not distant future. While many severely worded statements were made during this period concerning the benefits accruing from censorship, Lunacharsky nevertheless spoke for the prevailing opinion in the early 1920's. The date of the most liberal resolution on the arts passed by the Bolsheviks is also significant: June 18, 1925. It was a policy of sympathy towards non-Marxist authors and it allowed the maximum possible liberty in cultural matters. Unquestionably, libertarian socialism is a principal feature of the Marxist heritage and it has stubbornly recurred even in difficult moments.

Accordingly, the ideal of getting along without censorship was not a "hoax" perpetrated by socialists. We may still inquire whether it could be anything more than a myth. The libertarian socialist attitude surely has a tendency to create myths that will be sustained. And indeed all predictive attitudes towards history hold the seeds of myth. But what is myth? In this context, it is a transcendence of historical reality, a vision and imagination which is steadied with perceptions and steeled with perspicacity. An example is Prometheus, the ancient and long-lived image which reminds the Marxist of the goal of struggling for a more human world. Another example is Antaeus, who, like the plebeian masses, is cast down repeatedly, only to gather strength and come back more powerfully. The symbols of myths accumulate into patterns nourishing to the socialist expectation and they may easily assume an eschatological character. Nevertheless, it would be a serious error to equate the Marxist vision with an infantile fantasy, a *Schlaraffenland* or "pie in the sky." Why? Because it is not an idle fantasy to expect that censorship can be eradicated in every official and informal guise, and creativity nourished wherever it may appear. It should be remembered that socialism has hardly gotten underway. We still move ahead, by anxious experiment, with despair and revived hopes, toward our goal the socialist condition.

If we say then that the eradication of every kind of political censorship is not

a foolish myth; how will it be abolished? I see it occurring at the interior of this selfsame complex, dialectical process which since the first years of socialist power has acquired such a tragic stamp. We previously examined Russia of the early 1920's to see that the aspiration of artistic freedom was not a sham, but the same sampling of experience can also demonstrate the vast thicket of historical exigencies which resulted in the ascendancy of censorship. Indeed we shall not find how the censor can be eliminated until we see why he was able to claim his power and then hold it. In other words, we have to study the communist experience of social administration. The complete history of socialist censorship goes beyond the scope of this article. What can be glimpsed here are only a few turning-points. Speaking of Hegel, Marx commented once that tragedy can result from two kinds of revolutionary circumstances. First, where the emergent social forces overwhelm the social forces in decline and yet the latter still have a vital spiritual role since its values continue to be relevant to the positive development of the culture. Second, where the new social forces have emerged prematurely and a revolutionary crisis misfires, with the defeat of the gathering forces. The problem of prematurity is discussed by Marx in an exchange of letters with Ferdinand Lassalle (1859) about Lassalle's play *Franz von Sickingen*. Marx made some telling criticisms of this tragic historical drama (as did Engels in a separate letter). One of the criticisms was that a more suitable figure for the tragedy, drawn from the identical age, would have been the plebeian leader Thomas Munzer instead of the knight Sickingen. The knight's rebelliousness seemed to Marx an idiosyncratic, quixotic act; whereas Munzer's uprising held the seeds of future times. Marx's observations have relevance for the first emergence of socialist state organization. We shall also see, later, that Lassalle's defense of his own conception of tragedy has interest for us, too.

But let us scan the tragic turning-points as the socialist revolution continued. Power was seized in Russia on behalf of the vast majority, yet the number of political activists was small. This was the first crucial factor giving tragic results. Every major figure in the socialist Second International was hoping that shortly after the state power was acquired, the proletarians of the countryside and city, together with the intelligentsia, would enlist side-by-side with the earlier revolutionary cadres. But that was not how the wider populace responded to events. Apprehension on this score gripped Rosa Luxemburg when the Social-Democratic Party of Germany overwhelmingly endorsed the voting of funds to engage in World War One; the party leaders as well as members seemed unable to resist being stampeded down age-old blind alleys. The Bolsheviks of Russia, of course, resisted and denounced the war; yet what were the consequences of a correct course taken by a miniscule minority? Luxemburg again pondered this question when the Bolsheviks instituted a Red Terror after 1917. When decisions regarding liberty and life are reserved to a selected few, Luxemburg argued, freedom will degenerate into an empty phrase—even if one agreed that the few stand out as the finest of the proletarian vanguard. In precisely this framework Soviet censorship emerged on the horns of the larger Bolshevik dilemma. Lunacharsky's articles of this time are witness. He was convinced that the artist should be free to work, but he was also aware that a terrible Civil War was being fought in part

on the cultural plane. Could Lunacharsky dare to say no to censorship under the circumstances? In "Literature's Freedom and Revolution" of 1921 he declared that the Bolshevik dictatorship would lead to greater, nay unprecedented, social freedom. Lunacharsky also reviewed the course of one-party power in the previous years of War Communism, and asked, Did the proletariat have any recourse other than dictatorship? He concluded that the ideals borne in the revolution must be postponed a while. Lenin's view was the same. Cultural tolerance should be maximized, while vigilance against counter-revolutionary art must be maintained.

In this ambiguous and dilemma-ridden climate, the phrase "art is a weapon" began to pop up all over. It set a tone for both the minimal and maximal application of censorship. "Art is a weapon!" The slogan seemed legitimate in view of the Bolsheviks' hardpressed grip on authority, and in Russia it also had a long tradition, since for centuries art *had been* a weapon in the void left by the absence—the denial—of democratic institutions. This brings us to the second crucial factor leading to the tragic results. Socialists had to found their first state administration in a vast land bereft of democratic habits in politics. Artists had long since learned to act as people's tribunes and as political prophets. The ideological and social burden set on artworks in Russia far exceeded that known in 'normally developed' nations such as, say, England or Holland. If you know Russian literature from Gogol to Gorky, if you know its painting (such as the Peredvizhniki group), or its theatre before 1917; the developments after 1917 will seem less remarkable. Moreover, this Russian expectation for art was augmented by the idea common among socialists that as communism was approached the role of the artist would grow greater. The reader may ask, is the greater attention accorded to the artist and his opinions undesirable? It might be said that in a place like Great Britain, where people haven't imputed such a primary value to the arts, there is a more balanced and healthy situation. The point can't be explored here, but we should conclude by noting that widespread among socialist administrators and ideologists is the idea that artists hold an immense power to weaken or build attitudes among a people.

The third crucial detrimental factor we should note is the result of attitudes formed in the course of inner-party activity on the censorship issue. We can agree that party leaders and functionaries, who are subject to discipline and behavior rituals, tend to adopt corresponding attitudes. One does not wish to reject, as such, the discipline and the submersion of idiosyncrasies within the party, for this alone can ensure the function and even survival of organizations of this nature. However, the same traits do not transplant congenially into the administration of the society as a whole. Recall that the Soviet government was the product and governing instrument of a single party. Habits of mind within that political organization are therefore of paramount interest. When a party man would make a cultural decision affecting the society at large, he would generally judge—even if a literary critic—along purely ideological lines. The Bolshevik administrators did this in sincere good faith as a propensity for living the ideas of the party. Those wishing to back this propensity often based themselves on Lenin's "Party Organization and Party Literature" (1905). Yet could they justly

cite that article? They had to ignore Lenin's well-known hatred for bureaucratic narrow-mindedness; ignore, too, that after 1917 the power and responsibility exercised by the Bolsheviks was incomparably changed from the 1905 situation, so that, when the party orthodoxy merely read off the old text without regard for its historically-specific meanings, one could gasp at their naiveté or audacity. Glaring was the unsuitableness of a strictly instrumental policy for the arts in the new comprehensive circumstances of the party's impact on society. "Art is a weapon!" Even in less dangerous circumstances this was certainly a one-sided statement. Yet its implementation often fell in the hands of party functionaries quite unschooled in the particular attributes and problems of the arts. The damages this procedure could inflict are now part of history. I want to stress again that this outcome had nothing to do with the good or bad intentions of those upon whom the decisions fell, but was the result of transferring guidelines used within an embattled and nearly powerless party *en bloc* to the administration of society as a whole. At that point, belief in one's historical mission can supersede other values asserted previously as integral to the party's purpose. Consider the steps taken by Etienne Cabet, at the time he presided over the utopian Icarian community at Nauvoo, Illinois. Cabet took the censorship of the arts as his personal responsibility, although his published doctrines delegated such policies and decisions to persons well-acquainted with such fields. Did Cabet behave inconsistently, as some authors argue? I would say Cabet remained true to his first principle, which was to set in operation his conception of a fully rational social order. No one could be closer to that task, more responsible for it, than Cabet; so wasn't it also up to him to fend off any possible spiritual contagion which might infect the faithful? And if, at first, the "party" does this through charisma (*de facto*), eventually it will come to be done through bureaucracy (*de jure*). Still, despite everything in the new Russia reinforcing these attitudes and measures, a number of important party officials (Nikolai Chuzhak is a notable example) combatted the growing role of the censor. They resisted the seizure of artistic production and fought censorship which was without explanation and appeal. Lunacharsky, sharing their point of view, ridiculed those backward *Derzhymorda* (the term derives from the central character in Gogol's *Inspector-General*) who descended from the functionaries of the Tsar but who now spoke in Marxist cadences. However, this satire and these warnings were defeated by strident urgings that in the battle of ideas against the bourgeois world view, no flank should go unprotected. This logic, strongly promoted by the whole position of the Bolsheviks, found sufficient support among the masses, who, little exposed to world culture, were inclined to favor art that was traditional and which least challenged their perceptual conventions and everyday experiences. On this basis, Russian avant-garde art was suppressed, and the more traditional arts were retained and reoriented to the Bolshevik requirements.

These three major factors shaped the tragical developments flowing out of the October seizure of power. Others existed too; but these three especially focus on the key fact: that is, the chasm separating the idea and the reality, the social plan from the social resources, the proposal for socialism from the socialism feasible in that place and time and by the agency of the party initiating the effort.

But let's glance once more at the debate between Marx and Lassalle over the latter's drama *Franz von Sickingen*. The playwright readily admitted that his interest lay primarily not in the network of specific historical forces that gripped Sickingen, but instead in Sickingen's sense of himself, an individual who lived a revolutionary vocation without the assurance of a positive outcome. This was a protagonist who saw no possible way forward, yet, given his particular ideas, he could only join the social movement existing in his time. Although it was not adequate in the historical context, Sickingen acted as best he knew how. I am not discussing Lassalle's understanding of his hero to defend it against Marx's and Engels's arguments. On the contrary, the latter were right concerning the issue of the Peasant Wars in Germany. Even so, Lassalle's abstractive depiction of the tragical predicament does have some evident bearing on the post-1917 developments. The Bolsheviks saw no other course than to stake everything on the given situation and their own resources. The victory could scarcely avoid a certain overtone of catastrophe. One cannot equate the Bolshevik trajectory with that of Munzer, who perhaps despite himself, in Engels's analysis, betrayed the interests of the masses. The interests of the masses were not betrayed in 1917. Yet if the Bolsheviks honored the needs of the masses they were unable to redeem them. The one-party state either lacked the means to realize the ultimate socialist intentions or contradicted those aims in practice. The tragic predicament was the result of clashing antithetical sets of values, both essential in the situation. Political command of ongoing events was valued as the means to realize the socialist ideal of an untrammelled freedom and it was this very aim that gave the Bolsheviks much of their attractive power; yet the acts which sustained immediate power tended to impede the means to realize the ideal. Could the immediate political acts of the revolutionaries have been very different in character? Could the ideals have been incorporated in everyday administrative procedure from the first days after the seizure of power? No, the revolution's very survival would have been jeopardized. A surge of chaotic anarchy would have ensued with the renewed dictatorship of reaction. What should we then conclude from this predicament? That the members of the "idealist" wing of the Bolsheviks, described by those who opposed them as romantic and utopian maximalists, were simply deluded souls whose views deserved to be overridden? And that the practical, hardworking politicians, the "realists," had made the revolution and steered it away from defeat? No, that is erroneous; it leaves out the complexity of the real historical process. The revolutionaries relied on two distinct resources in their bid for hegemony: ideology and strategy. Divested of either, their efforts would have been at once ineffectual. Incongruous as they were, each was sustained in practice by the other, each had its 'right.' The antithetical combination—the contradiction between strategy and ideology—gave rise to the tragical clash within the context of revolutionary hegemony. It was precisely the duality of this winning combination which eluded the "realists" who argued that their sort of person took initiative while the idealists dawdled over day-dreams. It is accurate to say in this context of tragic clash that Lassalle's play, in its pitting of visionary enthusiasm and of practical reason, had its portion of prophetic veracity. The October Revolution pushed this antinomy to the exacer-

bated extreme.

The conflict of artistic enthusiasm and political reason—to transpose the issue into our initial terms—is central to Lunacharsky's essay of 1931, "Reflections on Communist Dramaturgy." Lunacharsky affirms neither position unconditionally. And how could he? The point of view is what we would expect of this astute and morally vigorous figure. Indeed the challenge is *not* to "choose" between art and politics. It is a means-and-ends predicament which faces the artist and the politician alike; and, as an ongoing process, it is open-ended. The 'right' inherent to art will be foremost for one; the 'right' of politics, for another. The contradictions will disappear only if and when the reasons for the dilemma are somehow bridged over, or superseded.

In time, the consciousness that there existed an antinomical predicament began to vanish. This was damaging to the Soviet course of development because the three shaping factors mentioned earlier, not sharply counteracted, took charge. The use of art as a terminal value became submerged by its usefulness as a means. The censor took control everywhere. Under Stalin a dictatorship was built intended to command all and to endure all. So overwhelming was this triumph of political authority that even Lunacharsky, at the end of his life, reversed himself and said the Soviet system could not tolerate a non-political artistic standpoint. The slogan "art is a weapon," available from the outset, was in the 1930's reinforced by another having the weight of a political police: "who is not with us is against us." Only artists who made clear their anti-Sovietism were restricted in the 1920's. Now, a fullscale and indiscriminate campaign against the independence of artists was begun, signalled by the suppression of Shostakovich's opera *Lady Macbeth of Mtzensk* in 1936, on the grounds it was decadent and divergent from the idiom and wants of the people.

Consider the Solzhenitsyn case. It brings before us, as at a curtain-call, all of the abusive practices of detrimental censorship. The novels of Solzhenitsyn moreover have a special interest for us because they are meant to combat the Stalinist heritage, rightly judging it a degenerated version of the socialist intent. Take *The First Circle*, its hellish world is more than antinomical; it is a negation of socialism. The author focuses on the tragical parody of freedom and justice. A scientific discovery, the phonoscopy, made by the scientist-prisoners, is to be used to jail other citizens who are still at liberty, whose uncontrolled utterances may now be detected. Does the country still suffer from technological backwardness? Never mind, the best-trained resource people, mathematicians, physicists and engineers will be locked away and squandered. The official propaganda praises dedication and commitment, but most of those who are not in jail are generally apathetic or afraid. Assuming that we have a conception of the promise held forth by Marx's thought, we must judge this world administered in his name a dreadful farce! Solzhenitsyn's heroes, Levka Rubin and his friends, do not relinquish their commitment to the communist ideal even though they have been prisoners for many years. But Solzhenitsyn's careerists clamber forward from post to post caring not a damn for ideas. A terrible and, in the author's opinion, still-tragic abyss yawns between the ideology that is praised and inculcated, and the patterns of social conduct. It is a shocking novel. Though the role of Stalin

is exaggerated to a diabolical intensity, a number of the inhuman practices justified by the ideals of Marxism are detailed. One could call *The First Circle* a protest against making the ends out of the means. However, at no point does Solzhenitsyn suggest the October Revolution was in vain. Rather he lambastes the authoritarian folly which was absolutized in the 1930's. Stalinist Russia is a topsy-turvy world, and Solzhenitsyn appeals for recognition of what properly is the socialist center-of-gravity. To be sure, he presents no more than a part of the truth. But this is the portion of the truth which has been long classified 'Top-Secret.' Revelations of this order are the very purpose of the artist. Could there be a more worthy subject-matter for the socialist artist in a land dedicated to the socialist idea? Is not Solzhenitsyn a noble instance of a politically committed author? If novels like these are still prohibited today, the onus belongs not to their author nor to the Marxist outlook, but to the political elements that insist on censorship. There are not enough strong arguments to rationally justify the prohibition of such works as Solzhenitsyn's in socialist countries. Just the opposite. Only in the socialist context does *The First Circle* find its apt audience and achieve its rightful cathartic function. A genuine threat to socialism, a real corruption of its course, is censorship itself, which by any standard is counterproductive today. Solzhenitsyn made this point effectively in his message to the Fourth Congress of Soviet Writers which is reproduced in the Bodley Head edition of *The Cancer Ward*. The latter novel similarly takes as its major theme the miserable quality of a life vulnerable to mindless terror and the ravagings of apathy in a warped social world which sees the cloddish informer, Pavel Rusanov, move up in a career while an independent character, such as Oleg Kostoglotov, is exiled and confined. Though he never mitigates the Stalinist crimes, Solzhenitsyn undoubtedly chooses socialism. He is especially devoted to demystifying the atrocities committed in socialism's name, to denouncing the big lies of the official propaganda, to showing the folly of the mistrust suffused throughout the society. On the other hand, he is weak at supplying constructive proposals. Solzhenitsyn seems to endorse the ethical-socialist program of his character Aleksey Shulubin only up to a point. Another important alter ego of the author, Kostoglotov, has grave doubts that moral commitment is fundamentally and unconditionally the constitutive power of socialism.<sup>3</sup>

Well, we certainly must ask why the restraining measures remain in force, when the "interlocked necessities" of the early Bolshevik period have long ago vanished? Can we point to sheer inertia? No doubt that's part of it. Yet we must also seek the *causes* of the inertia. Only then can we satisfactorily disentangle the reasons for the present tragic impasse. The search for causes could easily lead us into fishing the deep waters of sociological speculation, but let's stop short of that issue, which is very involved. We can be brief, and at the same time be rather sure that we are not making a mistake, if the following is stated: The plausibility won by Bolshevik censorship due to the earlier prevalent social conditions has now vanished. To refer to the earlier social model as a justification today is anachronistic. Censorship exists now as an arm of routinized power; its continuance is only a quasi-necessity since the historical mandate at its origin has been superseded. As a technique of administration, censorship has survived its *raison*

*d'etre*, and thus it would be a mistake to term its perpetuation a tragic predicament. There is no more conflict of 'right' and 'right.' Instead there is a dependency of conservative conduct and ideas on a compulsion which stems the movement of social life into fresh and spontaneous courses. How can we apply the term 'tragic' to barren, apparent values which restrain potentially more vital ones? Only the proponents of those suppressed values merit the term tragic. Meanwhile, the timorous philistine of socialism fears to catch a glimpse of his own face in the mirror of Solzhenitsyn's novels. Although the political censors may be convinced of their ideological function, they would not think of seriously confronting the implications of a work like, say, *The Confession* by London and Costa-Gavras. In a word, what one may now speak of as a socialist tragedy is the result of a cultural policy turning its back on historical truth.

The artist who agrees to submit to the requirements of the censor diminishes his art. The discrepancy between the official literature, theatre, cinema, and reality is simply too jarring. Some will have the bravery, of course, to render the world as it really is. They may escape being diminished but their works, deflected into an "underground" of communication, will have no more force than a whisper. It's a perplexing dilemma. One way of protesting against it, however odd this may seem, is to become silent. The 'insiders' who understand the semiotics of the cultural scene will read this signal aright. To the outsider unfamiliar with the 'code' of communication, this implied condemnation, as well as an elaborate allusiveness, will be merely puzzling. The significance of any unfamiliar cultural elements will be riddlesome, but here the ordinary difficulties of the 'code' are compounded by the restraints that are politically imposed. Another difficulty may be found in distinguishing between ostentatious gesture and genuine revolt. Some poems, performances, films, and the like only gain more acclaim (some of it perhaps semi-official) by flaunting some minor taboo with success. Yet possibly the absence of a certain individual from an official event of magnitude may be of more portent. One observes through the semiotic patterns that the situation engenders martyrs as readily as informers. All of which is highly detrimental from any standpoint. The *semiotics of evasion* are all the proof one needs that a socio-cultural situation is not desirable. What else can one conclude where a culture is warped and stunted, where the public is habituated to reading "between the lines" for prohibited meanings, where this *sotto voce* in art begins to speak more impressively than the accepted cadences? We can conclude that censorship has gone beyond mere abuse to become its own invalidation, though superficially it may appear to be successful. And even where censorship is moderate and mild it still is wrong.<sup>4</sup> Or are there some persuasive reasons to maintain political censorship over socialist art? Examining those which are advanced, I do not find any. Those sanctioned by institutions and convention—the safety of the country, or the system—are just empty phrases. It should always be first incumbent on the censorship to justify itself; otherwise, one must assume the right of the artists to communicate freely. A cultural policy should be compelled to explain why it has to arrest works of art. And art? No declaration, no justification, should have to be provided on its behalf. Art *is*. But it needs public exposure and critical discussion.

For anyone convinced that socialism stands for the present and the future of man's history, the abolition of censorship should follow as the day follows the night. Censors are ghosts out of the past: expell them! A censorship which is prolonged merely speaks of a feebleness in the system. However, socialism is today, in my view, sufficiently strong to survive the criticism of any art. Additionally, the more interesting and attractive the writers, the painters and the cinema directors become, the stronger the system will be, for the arts will become more favorable to socialism. I write in the aftermath of the Czechoslovakian events of 1968, and my thoughts may seem in this light a ridiculous speculation. Yet even in those events I have discovered confirmation of my line of thought. A similar course to the Czech one was introduced years earlier in Yugoslavia where it has led towards a certain degree and kind of libertarian socialism. Some Western Communist parties (especially the Italian) have studied with dismay the damage done by all hitherto socialist (Stalinist) governing practices, and they openly state the error of respecting civil liberties only as a legalistic article. If one looks at Hungary, a start has been made there towards more open and liberal elections of parliamentary delegates. Yes, *epur si muove*. A progressive democratization of the Communist system after 1956 has already become an irresistible process. It will continue, since socialism can only compete successfully with the non-socialist world by disencumbering itself from authoritarian chains. The process can and will be blocked here and there, but in the coming epoch, the barriers will finally go down.

## NOTES

1. Two companion pieces to this article have been published elsewhere: "Politicians Versus Artists," in *Arts in Society* (Madison), vol. 10 no. 3 (Fall-Winter, 1973) and "Censorship Versus Art: Typological Reflections," in *Praxis* (Zagreb), International Edition, vol. 10 no. 1-2 (1974). Another related article, "The Vicissitudes of Socialist Realism," was published in Morawski, *Inquiries Into the Fundamentals of Aesthetics*, MIT Press, 1974.
2. A similar messianic expectation appears in Saint-Simon, by the way. His *Letters* relating to the arts in the perfected society forecast that the industrialists will prove to be superlative patrons of culture. Full industrialism would bring the needed support for the arts, he predicted, and the artists, their status respected, would lend an unwavering support to the positive system. See *Oeuvres de C.H. de Saint-Simon*, Paris, 1966, v. III, pp. 163-164.
3. These few, brief points regarding Solzhenitsyn, I should add, parallel the splendid arguments made by G. Lukács in a short book on the author. I had not seen the Lukács text when I wrote this essay early in 1970. However, I would not call Solzhenitsyn a socialist realist, he is rather a critical realist of the bureaucratic era of socialism.
4. See the persuasive discussion of the arguments for and against censorship in F.C. Sparshott, *The Structure of Aesthetics*, Toronto, 1963, pp. 304-311; e.g., "If nothing is to be forbidden that does not certainly promote crime, it should by now be clear that censorship cannot in fact be justified . . . If there are censors, apparently they are going to make a lot of mistakes." (p. 307)