

Some of the techniques of the metaphorical method of solving problems in philosophy, science, and art involve the following:

1. Expanding a model or metaphor.
2. Regarding and treating each word and sentence as a metaphor or model.
3. Constructing analogies, even misleading ones, to give insight.
4. Personifying and deanthropomorphizing.
5. Juxtaposing, deviating, and substituting in the various ways indicated earlier, e.g., synaesthesia, relating familiar with unfamiliar, unknown to known, abstract to concrete (especially by giving concrete examples), usual with the strange, animate and inanimate, material to immaterial, juxtaposing unlike contexts, etc. Juxtaposing opposites or antitheses.
6. Creating crisis, elucidating, and tensive metaphors or conceits.

By means of the metaphorical method one can advance knowledge and avoid being captivated by one's metaphors.

In general in the arts as elsewhere there is a widespread use of metaphor. There is also a need to hear and create new metaphors for aesthetic, scientific, and everyday practical reasons. One may find that he has a metaphor hunger which must be satisfied by writing, by the arts, by conversing with those who speak metaphorically, or by creating new scientific models and hypotheses. One may obtain increased satisfaction with a greater knowledge of the nature of metaphor.

Expression

STEFAN MORAWSKI

Many have thought expression a most mysterious issue in art and have given up any attempt to come to grips with it through discursive analysis. I do not share this overly skeptical attitude. I prefer to propose that we get into the issue by discriminating the varieties of expression and the various usages of the term. This analysis is the more important, because certain usages we shall select to emphasize here are by no means accepted or even borne in mind. Warnings against abuse of the term have been common; they stem from philosophers, psychologists, and artists whose goal is to comprehend the aesthetic *praxis* both past and present as much as possible, and who understand that the obscurity or vagueness of some ideas of expression seems due more to the innate complexities of the problem than to the inadequacies of the particular student. Surely the unanimous rejection of any one unambiguous concept of expression has this final reason. Nonetheless, a number of scholars, who are part of the now ascendent linguistico-analytic school, lean so far in the opposite direction that they insist for clarity's sake on the disentangling analysis, with the matter at issue relegated to a secondary status. Indeed, through the last twenty years several distinct attempts were made to define expression in a single unified way, simply yet so lucidly as to render a diversity of definitions superfluous; all such endeavors were unsuccessful. Why? I dare say because all shared the failing of reductionism. Accordingly,

STEFAN MORAWSKI is a leading Polish aesthetician who lectures and teaches extensively in this country. He has served as a past editor of *Studia Estetyczne*, and has written such works as *Between Tradition and a Vision of the Future*, *Studies in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Aesthetics*, and *Inquires into the Fundamentals of Aesthetics* (forthcoming). His article "Artistic Value" was published in the January 1971 issue of JAE.

then, our approach must differ from these if the maximum clarity is to be had regarding the object of our study. The meanings of the concept should be disentangled; following that, we should inquire precisely what aesthetics has found most significant in the data of expression.

Yet if that is our major plan, there will also be a secondary aim. It emerges from a concern over the pitfalls germane to my own approach to aesthetics. For the terms "expression" and "mimesis" have frequently been treated in the Marxist tradition as though they were interchangeable and indistinguishable. I point out in my essay "Mimesis and Realism" that there exists a complicated yet close relationship between mimesis and expression: the two phenomena may coincide, or overlap, or even stand separately in a complementary way, as considered from the sense of expressiveness that we focus on here, and in dependence on the context (the circumstances) in which these phenomena appear. In light of my approach the most fundamental coherence of these categories derives from the sixth, final, meaning of expression as that term is differentiated here.

I shall explore different kinds of expression and the corresponding meanings of the term. What is common to all of them is that the ensemble of qualities (or manifested quality) which is ascribed to the given object proves in fact virtually psychical and finds its referent in the human subject.¹ These qualities, with their peculiar feeling-tone, their own physiognomy, have usually been described as tertiary to distinguish them from what are termed the primary qualities (measurable) and secondary qualities (color, sound, etc.) of the object. Where in the case of representation the artwork is demonstrably connected with the outside world, in the case of expression the relationship turns inward. This occurs both for the artist who conveys the expressive message, and for the recipient who submits to the experience of the evoked expressiveness. The chief difficulty that must be discussed in this respect has to do with the artist. He makes an object which is a semi-psychical mediation, and we might readily assume that he must be entirely sincere — that he "tells" us what he has genuinely felt. Yet it is beyond doubt that artistic "sincerity" approximates intimacy or exhibitionism only in extreme instances. Nor have we sufficient reason to assume that the expressive quality is always and precisely adequate to what was experienced by the artist in his creative process. If it is possible to speak of any correspondences here, it would be between the artist's assumed *intentions* to present this or that psychic state (though they may fail to be embodied) and the semi-sentient characteristics


of the given work.² Thus the only sincerity that can be of interest to aesthetics is that which pertains, not to a man making confessions, but to an artist who determines what and how to confess. We should accordingly understand the expressive relationship between the artwork and artist as intransitive and asymmetrical. Put differently: inasmuch as we reliably know a good deal about the artist's personality, the vicissitudes of his life, and his immediate allegiances, we will be entitled to pass judgment on the expressive features of his production as these possibly correspond to his temperament and character. But nothing of this kind can be attempted in the reverse direction. There is necessarily an investment by the artist in the work's expressive features. Yet as to the nature of that investment, it does not matter whether what the artist expresses is his genuine or feigned emotion or whether he merely presents feelings of some kind. Important for us will be the assumption that he intended such-and-such presentation and his success or failure in achieving his intentions.

Let us momentarily shift here from expression to the issue of intention. It seems rather crucial to considering the artist's expression whether he is understood as conveying what he really feels (sincerity in the form of intimacy) or what he has chosen to convey (sincerity in the artistic sense, i.e., congruity of idea and execution). How shall we relate to the question of committing the intentional fallacy? I do not subscribe fully to this notion, but it does have bearing in most cases. Even where, as suggested above, we do have documents with which we may check the executional pattern in the effort to discover if the artist intended to express himself in a certain way (Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*, "*c'est moi*"; the elderly Rembrandt's self-portraits; *Jeanne Hébuterne* painted by Modigliani), what concerns us on the expressiveness issue is not the work's relationship to the artist's experienced intentions but the intentional psychic state embodied in the artwork. And where we can speak of verifiably genuine intentions to create this or to create that in such-and-such ways, nonetheless we have embarked on a slippery road that takes us away from the artwork itself.

Yet it may be argued that in such instances we might understand the expressive features more fully when they are referred to the artist's biography. This could be seriously urged with regard to Rembrandt (his documented tragic sense of abandonment, of being made to face the terrible wrath of God which had so altered his fate). For Modigliani's picture it would be hard to make a comparable case, for

neither the beauty of Jeanne nor the painter's passionate love for her can be confirmed in the expressive dimension of the given work. Yet let us assume that we can make statements about works by Modigliani, Flaubert, and others as we have just made about Rembrandt's self-portraiture. Our major argument will remain intact and central: namely, that an artwork's expressiveness is sustained by its own composed elements and not by relation to the circumstantial emotions and even creative goals of its artist. If the artwork lacks expressive appeal to observers who know nothing about the artist, then it is a failure in its artistically expressive aspect. Let us summarize regarding intentionality. In responding to the expressive traits of the given work, all we can and should assume is a kind of hypothetical artist's intention to express this or that, in which, to a greater or lesser degree, he succeeds. With this formulation we make allowance for what has to be admitted, i.e., the inevitable transaction between the artist (considered whole, as a given human, creative personality) and his artwork. Yet we prohibit any reverse inferences. We mean to make no definite statements about the intention, its content, and its fulfillment. We adopt the standpoint, then, of the recipient who observes in an artwork some intentional semi-sentient data. Whether the artist's genuine emotions or even his true intentions are revealed thus remains problematical and a separable matter. We should bear these findings in mind, since, when artistic qualities are spoken of as expressive, we frequently tend to take it for granted that their semi-sentience has some direct relation to their creator's psychic life.³

From these reflections it may readily be seen why the art object, with its expressive properties, must be given central scrutiny as the mediating medium between the artist and his public. In mentioning the public, let me stress that expression entails not only the bestowing of certain semi-sentient characteristics on some data and their arrangements, but also the evoking in human agents of some genuine, sentient phenomena by means of those semi-sentient properties. Perhaps with this diagram we may roughly illustrate the result:



The recipient sometimes is actively cooperative; that is to say, to some degree he also "imbues" the semi-psychical qualities into the artwork.⁴ The effectuation of this hinges on three factors — the expressive qualities, the human subject, and the circumstances. On this question it is important for our analysis to distinguish between natural objects and artifacts, and among artifacts the artistic objects proper, since in the former two cases the recipient's activity can be considerably increased. This distinction brings us to the threshold of the first kind of expression among the six kinds we will investigate. And let us repeat: what we have said up to now seems to be applicable to all the kinds of expression we shall now investigate.

I. Expression can be defined as the empathetic projection into objects of one's images, accompanied by one's feelings and ideas; the objective counterparts are usually understood to be natural phenomena. This is but one point of view on expression, and conceived as the fundamental position it is anachronistic in light of the status of contemporary aesthetics. In this very abbreviated statement of the *Einfühlung* school's standpoint I admittedly ignore its various divisions. I choose the extreme formulation of the empathy theory. It amounts to a more securely argued version of the pathetic fallacy which we associate with John Ruskin; as such, it is a kind of antipode to Gestalt theory. We see the paradigm of the standpoint in the writings of T. Lipps and V. Lee. Lipps argued that, by virtue of the human capacity for empathy, the contrariety between a self and the aesthetically enjoyed object vanishes; for what we enjoy in that object is ourselves (*Ich Qualitäten*), that is to say, our free spiritual vitality which we have projected into the perceived and contemplated dance movement, work of architecture, depicted landscape. He gave importance to the "inner imitation" with which we involuntarily imbue the given object with our creative powers — since the artist's or the performer's activity is basically (i.e., metaphysically) no different. As importantly, Lipps rejected a completely specific relation of the sense feelings (which scan an object's structural features) with empathy. Lipps influenced Vernon Lee to adopt a similar standpoint. Granted, she questions her mentor's notion of empathy as the projection of a metaphysical ego; instead, she gives importance to the meeting of the qualities of the perceived object and the activity of the human subject. However, she admits no aspect of positive stimulus on the part of objective "physiognomical traits." She

goes so far as to protest that one must not confuse empathy with "inner mimicry" (sympathy). Lee asks us to assume, then, that the animation of the inanimate — for example, of the rising contour of the mountain — is solely the product of our imaginative faculty, and it lacks any correlative stimulation such as the particular shape of the mountain might produce. On the whole, the primordial theory of aesthetic empathy may be said to notice the existence of objective qualities, and it asserts the evocative powers of the artist; but it basically stresses the spiritual projection of the self, altering aesthetic experience into a para-aesthetic or creative experience. Let us look back at our diagram. Empathy theory attributes an arbitrary character to the "feedback" from the recipient into the artwork. The evocative quality of experiencing art is all supplied by the recipient-subject, while none of the evocation is assigned to the object as such. The theory of the empathicists has been critically analyzed so many times and by so many authors that there is no point in repeating it all. Vulnerable at the points its proponents think decisive, this version of expression seems the most unbalanced and the least helpful.

II. Another version of expression looks, not to the free projection of the imaginative faculty, but to the properties indigenous to the medium of the particular art. It asks what are the attributes of the selected *means* of expression, its materials. These properties consist of tones (their intensity, timbre, pitch, duration), colors (their saturation, splendor, spaciousness, volume), and similar materials relied upon by artists. The finest exposition of expression in this version that I have found is Karl Aschenbrenner's *Coherence in Art*.⁵ At present still to be published, this work speaks of "tendentive powers" which are inherent to the media themselves. The artist endows these media with his vision only by employing them in a definite context. For his part the involved observer will respond to the semi-sentient characteristics in the context of the whole pattern while attending to the potentialities of the medium. Expression in this version appears the very opposite of the previous interpretation. What the elementary instrumentalities of art convey is deemed much more important than is the human subject's additive; to the artist remains only the judicious selection. Returning to our diagram: in this case, the object's evocative effect is overstressed, while the input of both the artist and the observer is underrated.

We may also doubt in this instance whether the traits called expressive are of what we earlier discussed as a tertiary nature. For example the hue, saturation, and intensity ascribed to a given color are secondary qualities. As originally formulated (cf. Bosanquet, *The Distinction between Mind and Its Objects*, 1913, and Alexander in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 14th ed.), the idea of tertiary qualities indicated a feeling tone which seems a property of the object. The notion was subsequently developed to place emphasis on certain felt qualities of the aesthetic object. Indeed, in this sense one could associate the expressiveness of the materials (assuming the medium is in fact inherently "tendentive") with a tertiary character, inasmuch as certain feeling tones are stimulated. Yet if we think in terms of artistic wholes, this distinction among certain primary, secondary, and tertiary qualities must then seem somehow lacking. For we probably would say that an integral, seamless expression informs even such physical (that is, primary) elements as dance movement, the contour of a building, a poem's prosodic and metrical traits, and graphic composition. It therefore seems correct to accept the second interpretation of expression only in part. Rightly it does guide our attention to the *co-expressiveness* of the medium (material). In combination with the next interpretation of expression, it provides us with fundamental valuational qualities.

III. Expression can also be seen as pertaining to particular qualities imbued into a given context and arranged in a certain way which brings out the peculiar attributes and effects of the various givens. What is the crucial dimension here? Most important are the many-sided aspects established by dominance and subordination, emergence and recedence, simplicity and intricacy, compactness and looseness, repletion and depletion, harmony and disharmony, rhythm and arrhythmia, swift and slow movement (in the arts of time), monotony and variety, contrast and melding, among other possible relations. All the above aspects are commingled and form such material qualities as delicacy or crudity, exuberance or refinement and calm, elegance or ostentation, gaudiness or restraint, subtleness or garishness. When we discuss these characteristics we ascribe them as semi-sentient qualities to the given artistic wholes. Do we find a literal refinement, crudity? No; rather, we indicate their feeling tones, very much as we discern sadness in a musical piece or charm in a dancer's solo performance.

Expression in this version variously embraces Pollock and Miro,

Stravinsky and Hindemith, Kurosawa and Antonioni, Moore and Giacometti, Saarinen and Corbusier, St. John Perse and Esenin, Isadora Duncan and Jerome Robbins. Undoubtedly these examples invite the charge of having been randomly selected from the twentieth century only with an eye to contrasts. True enough; and yet for the sake of succinctness, the memorable and even crude contrast is often most communicative, though each of the suggested cases does require a thorough analysis of its particular expressiveness. My aim for the moment is limited: to support a fourfold proposition. *a)* All artworks are to some degree expressive (in the present, third sense). *b)* The more artistic the object, generally the more expressive it is in its own peculiar way (note that "expressionistic" art — cf. our fifth version — is not better than any other kind of artistic expressiveness). *c)* The expressiveness of this third kind is especially striking in the case of non-objective art. *d)* While representational art also is expressive, its expressiveness has a cause other than the description or depiction of emotions and their outward show.

To dwell on the last point: consider the portraits made by painters of the Italian High Renaissance. Surely they represent certain emotional traits of their subjects. However, it would be hard to argue that these pictures are very expressive. In contrast, the paintings of El Greco and self-portraits by Rembrandt and Van Gogh are compellingly expressive. They become so owing not to the countenance of the represented person, but to the way the paint is organized: the colors, lines, texture, composition. Consider another instance: Yunchiro Tanizaki's short novel *The Key*. Its expressiveness (as that of M. Kobayashi's film *Harakiri*) derives not from the hero, who is perversely obsessed with sexual frustration; it is found in the way the tale is told. Tanizaki's aesthetic patterning is informed with ethical distance, with refinement and crystalline clarity. This example also helps us see how we could understand this version of expression to take full account of the individual style or manner. The more the works of a given artist come back to the same choices and arrangements of materials and media, the easier it becomes to locate some earmarks of a singular expressiveness characteristic of his production. (We shall also see evidence for the latitude of personal expression in the two versions which follow.)

Now let us consider this third version in the light of subject-object relationships. The expressive characteristics are ascribed to the art object itself. The Gestalt school, and Rudolf Arnheim especially, bring

out the implications of this assumption in illuminating depth. The artist supplies the properties which have semi-sentence; through them he evokes the feelings in the public which approximate those once produced in his own creative personality, i.e., those which he intends should convey this or that artistic "message." This imminent status of expression is the setting in which we affix the term "symbolic," implying the meaningful character inherent in the particular qualities and above all in their patterns. Does the Gestalt theory tell us if the artist's expressive signs, as implanted in the artwork, are commensurate with the response of the public? And if so, how? This is a problem I cannot explore here; its complexity needs a separate study. Yet quite apart from the disputes that may rage over the genetic factors, we have to acknowledge the fascinating, remarkable phenomenon of virtually psychical qualities that are inherent in art objects.

We have paused in the argument of this essay to dwell on the third version of expression. Its centrality is our excuse; serious aesthetic inquiry cannot pass it by. The rich lode it constitutes is demonstrated irrefutably by Mikel Dufrenne's *Phénoménologie de l'expérience esthétique* (1953). Understood predominantly in this version — as I believe it should be — expression as an artistic value will reveal most profoundly the variety and multiplicity on which it may be founded. The possible concrete, inherent "physiognomies" are beyond categorization, ranging from abstruseness to crystal clarity, from obscure intricacy to simplicity, from velvet suavity to garish crudity, from consonance to dissonance, from monotony to dazzling charm. As infinite are the ensembles — better, the patterns — of the specific valuational qualities. I think we could have small hope of achieving a precise catalog and analysis which would describe how this or that quality or pattern could be anticipated and brought about. Indeed, it is difficult to pinpoint the precise relation between the valuational qualities (and patterns) and the varieties of expressed "physiognomies"; it may be this trouble in describing stable and reliable correspondences which partly encourages the widespread view among aestheticians that expressive values are ineffable.

Possibly the reader will believe he finds a contradiction between what has just been written and our earlier judgment that the medium (materials) may prove inherently expressive due to some distinctive properties. I don't see how we can deny the expressive appeal which is inseparable from the established tone of certain instruments (a violin or flute) or the texture of some substances (wood or metal) or certain

rhythmic meters (iambic or spondaic). The warm and the cool ranges of the color spectrum are widely accepted. Musical annotation assumes a similar expressiveness: *andante*, *presto*, *vivace*, *con brio*, etc. Yet it seems no contradiction to insist on the primary hegemony of the expressive form (the entire given structure). As we remarked while discussing the second version of expression, the medium (materials) will rarely appear to claim pride of place as the exclusive or even foremost valuational quality; usually it is incorporated and modulated with other dimensions of the given artistic whole. Then, second, even if the material proves foremost in some simple patterns, we shall find trouble in ascribing to it a definite, single expressive value. Harsh and high-pitched notes (tones) can produce feelings of terror, or anxiety, or just displeasure. Warm colors as such can evoke a feeling of joy or perhaps boredom. A room interior dominated by aluminum may give us a slight *frisson*, a sense of fragility which irritates, or a soothed lassitude or perhaps a dull exasperation. In all these cases the ultimate expressive evocation undoubtedly derives from the totality comprised by the qualities and the structure and the context in which the artistic whole functions.

IV. Expression may also be understood as the singular characteristics of a particular dance or music performance. Specifics of this order are inherent in the process-like "objects" that are achieved through interpretation, and they derive consequently from the idiosyncrasies of the particular performers.

Let us give a warning here, much like the one stated earlier. In performance too we must not equate expression with the spontaneous, intimate experiences of the dancer, violinist, or pianist. The expressed feelings may simply be feigned. Or (on the model of theatrical acting: the Stanislavsky technique with its psycho-physical exercises is apropos) feelings can be deliberately stimulated so as to induce the authentic experience. Often a performer perfectly duplicates a pattern of embodying the particular artwork in performance after performance. There is ample reason to believe this is not due to the artist's having brought his expression into the tightest relation with what he genuinely experiences. Performers, we may observe, are capable of growing as "cool," as distant from the "object" they are producing for us, as is the painter or composer or playwright.

We should likewise be perfectly clear about the bifurcated character of the expressive performance—"object." Due to its nature the expressive qualities of this artwork undergo remoulding. An exact replica of the enduring matter of the work is a fatuous notion; a rote duplication of earlier successful performances is all but impossible, and probably undesirable. The specificity and idiosyncrasy of each successive performance—the individual touch, the manner, and style—modifies the expression that is implied by the musical or the dance score.⁶ We praise in their own right the interpretive styles of Jascha Heifetz or Sviatoslav Richter.

I did not begin analysis of this fourth version with theatrical performance as a primary instance. I preferred to set it aside while musical and dance expression were explored, due to the greater complexity of the theatrical question. However, already we have said things applying to the director in the theater. It is time to broaden the analysis, to deal with theater too. Let us make the connection by focusing on the artistic personality of the play director. (Let me stress that if I use the term personality, I do not mean it literally; I mean it to indicate the particular and distinctive traits that are manifested in the work of the artist—here, the theater director.) We may agree that the approach of Olivier or Brook to Shakespeare is undoubtedly expressive. A developed philosophy of the theater sustaining the director or stage designer (Craig, Appia, Brecht, Lebel) may well appear to increase the expressiveness. The director's expression necessarily has a different embodiment than does that of the dancer or violinist, since the stage director does not usually perform in his own person. This latter circumstance forbids us any encompassing statements about "the" expressive quotient of the theater director. Productions shaped by some directors display their capacity to totalize control. Where this happens we study the collective, the unified performance. Nothing short of this, we then understand, can entirely realize the expressive vision of stage directors. At this degree of integration, theater, like music and dance performances, may be analyzed in terms of ensemble expression. We should not forget the protracted collective assimilation and preparation of the artistic ideas which alone condition ensemble expressiveness. Common to the Peking Opera, Jerome Robbins's ballet, the Stanislavsky company, and later the Berlin Ensemble of Brecht or the Grotowski or Bread and Puppet theaters are coherent and notably distinctive compositions of expressive performance qualities. A unique collabora-

tion must pervade the work of the companies — even if the ideas supplied by one person have organized the ensemble's expression.

V. With the preceding four definitions of expression, every art object or performance has been a potential case for discussion. We turn now to a version with restricted application. Its relevance extends just to certain works — those that may be variously described as dynamic and harsh, highly intense and dramatic, pervaded with dissonant elements, skewed to the morbid and ugly and fugitive. Normally we find this class of artworks (and performances) contrasted with works expressive of a static harmony and a concordant beauty. It is argued that the latter are impersonal achievements while "expression" (in this understanding of it) is proof of an absence of self-control, the admission that one lacks magisterial command in art.⁷ This special idea of expression is particularly fostered by the experience of the Expressionist movement in art. One inevitably recalls the *Brücke* and *Blaue Reiter* groups, or Wedekind and Strindberg, Benn, and Mahler. The tendency primarily flourished in Germany and Scandinavia. However, we should not overlook the antecedents and legacy of the school. Some philosophers wish to apply a comprehensive name to this propensity of art, Romanticism. I don't care for that term in this context. It applies also, more aptly, to a specific era in art. Yet the propensity itself does exist and moreover is permanent: some artistic realizations tend to have the traits which are labeled Expressionist. The artistic pendulum swings to reinforce this propensity whenever social stability weakens, when civilization starts to crumble and religious (metaphysical) syntheses are dispersed by the urgent problems of the day. To be noted also: the preference of the artworks in this legacy may occur entirely separate of any concrete interest in the art's themes — in its social and psychological conventions and also its metaphysical content. The taste for expressionism may be developed on the basis of its inherent organizing expression.

In brief conclusion, we may offer one correction. It would be useful (and correlated with our approach elsewhere) if we spoke of this version of expression as manifested to some degree, instead of being categorically different. We should probably speak of the more intensively expressive traits which appear in some art objects — say, works of Van Gogh, Rouault, Soutine, Chagall, Surrealist poetry, Gaudi's buildings, Witkiewicz's novels and plays — as compared with some others. To use this formulation of course doesn't eliminate the restricted sense of this version of expression. Instead, that sense is qualified.

VI. The last version of the concept of expression we shall discuss involves psycho-sociological equivalents. Here the art object is studied so as to relate to what is embodied of socio-historical material abroad at the time and place of the work's origin, which moreover has been internalized, experienced, and felt by people then living, and transformed into correlated expressive attributes by the artist. Here, in other words, are the expressive equivalents of social moods, intuitions, beliefs, strivings, and opinions. Every artwork to greater or lesser degree is treated as a symptom and emblematic depository of the life of society, including especially its mythology and ideological conventions which, having become feeling-patterns, function at the indefinite boundaries between the rational and the irrational. The artistic personality is here considered as a mediation between these widespread but diffuse attitudes and psycho-social patterns, and an artwork where certain correlative expressive attributes appear. The function of the artist points in two ways: to the materials of historical experience, and to the expression in art; to the artist's "what and why" and also to his "how." We must not confuse this idea of expression with the others. It considers the artwork's particular qualities so as to refer them to a collective social subject, and in doing this it objectifies the expressiveness itself. Not only is the expression palpable and a stimulus to aesthetic experience in the recipient in this version; moreover, it manifests a sentient world antecedent to it.

It is essential to note that this idea of expression not only refers to rendering the aforementioned moods, intuitions, beliefs, goals and opinions; it also assumes that, in part at least, this may be accomplished through the overt behavior — which corresponds to the internalized socio-historical data. Patterns of lifestyle are themselves considered "expressive," that is, potentially adequate to convey the inherent social psychology. Expression may draw on both internal and external phenomena. The concepts of W. Dilthey may well be judged useful in discussion of psycho-sociological expressiveness. His hermeneutics remains important to German aesthetic thought and it exerts a wider influence.⁸

What is the Marxist heritage on this problem? As we indicated at the start, the terms "mimesis" and "expression" have generally been used interchangeably. A precedent for doing so is the practice of Hegel and Taine. Plekhanov provides a significant case of this confusion of the terms; his influence on the early stage of Soviet aesthetic thought was decisive on this issue, as on others. However, as a legacy it has

had a lucid defender and explicator in Georg Lukacs. Both in early writings and in his late major work *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen*, Lukacs, drawing on Dilthey, seeks consciously to reconcile the identity of the two categories. Lukacs subsumes what we have discussed here as a sixth aspect of expression within his universal category, mimesis. He proceeds accordingly (and arbitrarily, I find) to outline the presumed mimetic character of music, dance, architecture, landscape gardening, and the applied arts. I cannot go into my reasons for differing with Lukacs here; some of the points at issue are treated in my essay on Lukacs in *Science and Society* (Winter 1967). Let me just make clear that in my view the nonobjective arts are unquestionably expressive — and precisely through their expressive traits do they relate to the social world at the time and place of their origin. Nor is psychosociological expression absent from literature, theater, the cinema; but there it mainly hinges on the representation of the social psychology of the characters of the fiction.

Here, then, are representation and expression, two aspective sides of a single notion holding that the nondiscursive experience of a given society can be rendered in artistic "messages." The dual aspects are generally complementary and confirm the social meaningfulness of one another. This is because the two aspects — whether congruent or confluent — both have their referents in the substratum of a specific place and time, a "climate" (the common, vague word for it) which is pervasive in the style of the arts and the style of life. In the representational arts the two aspects may coincide and merge. We find then that an expressive manner (or style) which describes (and typifies) emotions has been organically unified with mimetic description and realistic typification, as is well seen in, say, Van Gogh's *Chair* or *Shoes*, S. Przybyszewski's novels, or Strindberg's dramas.

A difficult question may be counterposed here. Why, it may be asked, should we grant reality to a collective social subject, and presume it to be the emotional progenitor of the expressive qualities of an artwork, when we hung back from admitting a definite relationship of this kind in terms of individual experiential data? Aren't we using a double standard? No, I think not. There seem solid reasons for linking expressiveness with a social substratum. First, let me remind the reader that we did not reject the possibility, the potential for an adequacy between the art object and the artist's genuine experience. Rather, we found the much greater importance there to lie in the emotions presumably intended by the artist for embodiment in his object. Moreover,

the situation is not identical when we come to the collective psychosociology. Impressive evidence is at hand from many sources for the statement that no artist can divest himself of ties with the substratum, that none can act independently of the "climate" containing him as he grows to adulthood, lives, and works. Another point is that the social feelings at issue here, the "climate" suffusing the artwork, consists not so much of the subtle, elusive outrunners of emotion in the society as it does of the popular conventions, the shibboleths and the catch phrases. In a word: this substratum consists of the modes of thinking, feeling, and behaving displayed in the "public theater" in which all must be actors to at least some degree. Perhaps we should mention the ancient category "decorum" as suggesting the frame of reference. The artist may use these resource materials as expressive building-blocks, with a number of varieties of intention. Sometimes the artist totally identifies with the building-blocks; more often he adopts a certain distance on the more publicly acknowledged modes of social feeling. But finally, precisely to communicate his own intended emotions, the artist will rely to some degree on the use of the recognized community expressions of feeling.

In adopting this interpretation, we parallel the basic hermeneutic idea of a direct connection from the *Zeitgeist* through a mediative artistic personality to the artwork. There is some of the method of hermeneutics — *Verstehen durch Nacherleben* — which, if freed of the irrationality which is its implicit principle, may be accepted. I mean its view that to understand a work of art (and its context), one must reconstruct the then-prevailing modes of feeling, thinking, striving, describe the contemporaneous mystifications and the equivocal response by the artist to the prevailing moods and beliefs. This will be the Marxist's approach. The artwork almost certainly will prove to have no simply deciphered and immediately causal relation to the given social psychology. Many artists bury their social feelings, distort them, try to elude them. These strategies can be taken into account as an analysis is developed. But more to the point: as we argued earlier, whether the emotional expressiveness is genuine or feigned by the artist, whether he attributes it to himself or to certain others — none of this matters for the present analysis. The artist may have his buried, distorted, elusive relationship to publicly shared emotion of his time, yet the imprint of the "collective social subject" will be registered. Art is always a symbol mediated by an artistic subjectivity. At the same time art is in every case "symptomatic," for the artist's response is

never purely idiosyncratic—or, to put it another way: it always hinges on the given collective social subject—positively, negatively or evasively.

What can we say now of the relation between mimesis and expression alluded to at the start of the essay? We said then that the two categories have a close and complicated relationship: they may coincide, or overlap, or even stand separately in a complementary way. If what we have said in the preceding few paragraphs is correct, then so was that opening formulation.⁹

In my opinion the versions three (formal and material valuational qualities) and four (performance criteria), both oriented on the artist's individual "signature," are the fundamentally constitutive aspects of expression. Version one—as I tried to suggest—puts us in mind of the part played by the recipient's empathy in some cases of expressiveness, and especially in our relation to nature (e.g., landscapes imbued with significance through our moods), but it is outdated in its basic claim for universal application. Versions two, five and six, while disparate in application, seem about equal in weight: that is to say, from the morphological point of view we must pay attention to the expressiveness of the media (materials) of art: from the stylistic point of view we take an interest whether some expressive properties are more expressive than others; and from the point of view of artistic genesis and function we take an interest in the psycho-sociological expressiveness of art. (Here there is a bearing on the comparative meaningfulness of art, a related issue.)

As emphasized at the outset, the aim of this essay was modest. Whether my analysis has led to a clearer understanding of the nature and function of artistic expression as an independently important topic is something I cannot judge. The foregoing six kinds of expression (and corresponding concepts) seem to me too obvious. Yet perhaps I am deceived and I overstate the facility of scrutinizing these distinctions.

Certainly there are other substantial points of view on expression that I could not even begin to discuss in the scope of this study. If I have refrained from touching on them it is because in one way or another they are all derivative from the six concepts here distinguished. I fully realize that these six deserve more ample consideration; they require further clarification, quite possibly correction, but certainly development and elaboration. If the reader finds any hint of definitive statement in the essay, I urge that he excuse it as a slip of thought and

pen. Among the issues not grappled with, and yet basic to the elucidation and proper rating of the concepts treated, we must mention the whole question of the genesis of artistic expression—its favorable conditions for emergence, its process of interiorization and then exteriorization, and the place of nature and of social history in generating and evolving the expressive symbols. Onto these obscure passageways I have scarcely opened the door.¹⁰

Notes

1. Nelson Goodman in the excellent ninth chapter of his book *The Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1968) has done much to dispel the occult aura attached to the idea of expression. He and I agree that the problem of expression is basically distinct from that of the depiction or description of the world. We do, however, disagree in the ways we treat the question of the latter, denotational operations. I accept and mean to build on Goodman's statement that expression is a "metaphorical exemplification." By this notion Goodman indicates an insentient property that is possessed by a symbol and having a sentient frame of reference.

2. In this sense, we may and we should distinguish between artistic expression and ordinary expression (an example of the latter is the smile on somebody's face as the sign of genuine joy). In ordinary life the only parallel to the former are so-called professional signs of expression, and insofar as we find a diplomat, lawyer, physician, etc., "intending" (acting) these expressions, we are reminded of artworks.

3. Incidentally, let us remark that one should distinguish between those emotions of the artist which are occasional and happenstance and are only rarely transmitted as such to artworks, and those others, dependent on temperament and character, which may be said to provide his expressive "signature." I believe no one will question the latter's role (their function is recognized in our third variant and emphasized in the fourth). In regarding the "signature" we notice again the equivocal impact of the artist's "intentions" on the artwork or entire *oeuvre*. The role and uniqueness of a given artist may be read out of his works for the most part and sometimes exclusively, and not from his biography or his commentaries.

4. There is a question which must be skipped over here as too time-consuming and wide of our mark, namely, the character of the emotions experienced as aesthetically expressive. I assume that in most cases the recipients really do feel sorrow or joy or pain or delight. I can understand why the notion of catharsis (Aristotle) is part of the foundation of European aesthetics. Art may sometimes so move us that it returns to us in dreams or haunts our memory. Nonetheless, the emotions differ from those in ordinary experience. Their gray-zone status derives from art's broader condition of virtuality (or more narrowly stated, its fictionality). Due to this status, Cole-

ridge's notion of suspended disbelief also relates to the most genuine emotions aroused by cinema, music, and poetry. This is not because of the presence of given expressive traits, but is a characteristic of aesthetic experience as such.

5. I am indebted to the generosity of the author, who allowed me to examine his ingenious argumentation in the manuscript stage. Other works that refer to this point of view can be mentioned: T. M. Greene, *The Arts and the Art of Criticism*, 3rd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), and D. W. Gotshalk, *Art and the Social Order*, 2nd ed. (New York: Dover, 1962). The wealth of examples supplied in these books relieves me of the need to mention others.

6. This is not the place to analyze the "personal touch" of a painter or writer. Of course, these too have the potential of a uniquely expressive style or manner. In the visual and literary arts, however, the individual expressiveness is rather directly and fully imbued into the ultimate art object. Only as a secondary question will we perhaps be drawn into discussion of the idiosyncratic latitude of the literary or painterly artistic process. In the performing arts, for obvious reasons the processual idiosyncratic expression is a high-priority question. "Processual" means here "interpretive," or, to be quite clear: a two-fold expression occurs. Our attention is focused by the question to what extent the interpreting artist preserves and at the same time modifies the primordial expression which is the musical score or stage or film script. If he improvises, then the expression that is achieved in the process of performance as such should be subsumed in our third category.

7. In my view, this notion also underlies or supports certain contemporary avant-garde points of view which programmatically turn away from "expression," even though the critics who examine the specific given avant-garde tendency, including the differences among its individual practitioners (also the most "impersonal" of them), persistently find traits that should be termed expressive. A good current case is Minimal art. Its founders, artists with sympathizing art journalists and critics, say that Minimal art is non-physiological, flat, technological, linear and geometrical, architectonic, etc. Cf. G. Battcock, ed., *Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology* (New York: Dutton, 1968). And some Minimal artists proudly relate their work to serial, systemic thought. Forerunners are claimed in Duchamp, Malevich's Supermatism, and Constructivist experiment. However, the Battcock book also brings out that many supporters of K. Noland, B. Newman, A. Reinhardt, and T. Smith do find their Minimalism expressive. Direct acquaintance with the works is confirming; for even to make a "cool" art devoid of symbols and individuality will likewise imprint a "feeling tone." H. Rosenberg and R. Wollheim allude to this roundabout or backdoor expressiveness, when they see connections of Minimalism and Dada or mention its conspicuous gesture. In the present framework of analysis, version three and especially version four are applicable.

8. E.g., E. A. Lippman, "The Problem of Musical Hermeneutics: A Protest and Analysis," in S. Hook, ed., *Art and Philosophy* (New York: N.Y.U. Press, 1964), 307-35. Lippman refers the significance of musical symbols to a community of understanding and emotion. He locates an ultimate basis in nature for the human tonal experience. However, he stresses and calls primary the importance of socio-cultural conditions. Lippman finds these are

the source of the multiple meanings in a given artwork, as well as of the variety of styles, and the predominance in a given period of certain trends.

9. When this essay was already finished, I read Alan Tormey's *The Concept of Expression: A Study in Philosophical Psychology and Aesthetics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). Tormey excellently defends our third version of expression, oriented to formal properties. I have only praise for his discussion and for his argument, very like my own, that mimesis and expression should be discriminated, for to portray expressive actions is not tantamount to expression proper (cf. pp. 53-55, 138-39). However, in the fourth and fifth chapters, Tormey finds unwarranted the imputation of artistic expressiveness to the intentional state of the individual human subject; how much more, then, he presumably would reject the imputation to a collective human subject! I do not find enough validity in his counterarguments, nonetheless, to justify a negation of versions six and four in our analysis. What is Tormey's case? Effectively he shows there is no way to disprove that the expressive physiognomical qualities of a given work of art have direct reference to analogous intentional states that are experienced by artists. (All the same, Tormey himself cites the case of Carl Nielsen to demonstrate that a depressed musician can produce a humoresque.) Yet both his proof and exemplification are insufficient. Why? First of all, there exists a body of literary proof (especially, perhaps, the "Romantic" irony and the so-called *Künstlerroman* where the author's alter ego is the hero) to show that the artist's creative experiences have a direct effect on what he may express in his work. Second, it is possible to introduce irrefragable examples of the expressive properties of an artwork and their direct source in an artist's experiences — in what he truly felt and not simply what he intended to objectify as a creative reality. One such instance is A. Mickiewicz's desperate longing for his homeland and the epic poem, "Pan Tadeusz," written by him. A third proof of the insufficiency of Tormey's argument: the absence of any guarantee that the imputations will be well or ill founded may have mixed implications. In other words, the impossibility of disproof doesn't exclude that the correlation does exist! Fourth (and here I refer the reader to a fine discussion by Tormey in chapter II): we do indeed impute behavior to certain intentional states, if the referable data can be observed in complex patterns that conform to our hypotheses. Since this is so, why cannot we say the same for artistic expressiveness — especially where the pattern (documents left by the artist or his associates) confirms that the artistic expression has a plausible relation to the expressive psychic character? If this line of argument is correct, we shall also agree that the equivocal ambiguities of "expression" are irreducible — and in addition that version six should be retained.

10. Of importance for these questions, besides the Gestaltist view, is the Jungian hypothesis which sees expression shaped by the archetypal mythology of mankind. A conjecture to note is Harry S. Broudy, "The Structure of Knowledge in the Arts," in Ralph A. Smith, ed., *Aesthetics and Criticism in Art Education* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), 23-45. Broudy discusses "imaginative schemata" as giving rise to aesthetic experiences, and to symbolic expressiveness in particular, for which he sketches a genetic explanation

which relates both to the natural human situation and to man's nurturing in society.

In the Marxist (particularly Soviet) literature on the question of the genesis of expression, a sociological explanation is usually advanced. But a natural propensity that generates expression is not wholly excluded. In the Soviet musical aesthetics of the 1920s and 1930s, when a theory of expressive qualities formulated by Boris Assafiev prevailed, the natural side of expression was widely acknowledged and analyzed. In recent years a few Marxist aestheticians (among them Ernst Fischer) have revived the issues centering on the origins of expression. The affinity of expressive traits within art and magic is emphasized. Indeed, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the most driving source of expression is the impulse to animate the inanimate, combined with the peculiar response to a likeness (*similis simili gaudet*). Thus we too find it "natural" to respond to the objectified semi-sentient qualities. Still another apropos theory concerns the habits we pick up and retain even while forgetting their origins. Thus we would come to associate certain qualities with our childhood fears, joys, and the like. When grown up, we would find these same qualities fearful or joyful and not quite understand why. However, this approach is not sufficiently incisive. We still are left to determine what it is that makes us respond one way or another, and why. Are the associations that we internalize merely accidental and circumstantial? Are they based on inborn schemata? On a propensity for animistic magic? On what? By the way, the genesis of aesthetic expression is a problem that cannot be resolved without answering the question of the origins of human culture and art in general.

Destruction as a Mode of Creation

JOHN FISHER

It is not surprising that man, that awesomely destructive creature, has turned his violent talents toward art and insisted that in the extirpative act he can be a creator, an artist.

Destruction is commonplace, everywhere, everyday, and works of art are not immune to this kind of violence. A careful look at what can and does happen to works of art will help to avoid later confusions.

1. *Accident*. A fire sweeps a gallery in the dead of night. A valuable Monet is ruined by flame, smoke, and water. The Turks store explosives in Athens' Parthenon and a Venetian cannon shell blows the marvelous temple apart. A child drops his grandmother's precious Ming bowl. Art objects are thus destroyed, and we note it sadly. It should not happen that way, but accidents, we say, do happen.

2. *Wearing out*. A visitor to Milan of a different century saw a different Leonardo fresco from the one we see. *The Last Supper* has suffered irreparable disintegration. Now hardly recognizable, in spite of the Pelliccioli restorations, it has been the victim of accelerating deterioration of materials. In Venice sulfurous industrial gases mix with rain water and air to become an acid deadly to many of the statues and stone buildings. The whole city is a victim of a cruel dissolution, not natural, but not unrelated to certain natural processes of wind, rain, and weather. This tragic destruction causes concern in every center of antiquities, and also in modern cities which are sometimes even less resistant to pollution damage. Ancient manuscripts must be kept hermetically sealed and protected from light, even in the best environ-

JOHN FISHER is professor of philosophy at Temple University, editor of The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, and an associate editor of the Journal of the History of Ideas.